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 Abstract 
 
The paper explores the trade competitiveness of seven major shrimp exporting countries, 
namely Vietnam, China, Thailand, Ecuador, India, Indonesia and Mexico, to the USA. 
Specifically, we investigate whether the United States (US) antidumping petitions impact upon 
the bilateral revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indexes for each of the seven shrimp 
exporting countries with the USA. Monthly data from January 2003 to December 2014 and the 
panel data model are used to examine the determinants of the RCA for the shrimp exporting 
countries. The empirical results show the shrimp exporting countries have superior 
competitiveness against the shrimp market in the USA. Moreover, the RCA indexes are 
significantly negatively influenced by shrimp prices, and are positively affected by US income 
per capita. However, the EMS (Early Mortality Syndrome) shrimp disease, domestic US shrimp 
quantity, exchange rate, and US antidumping laws are found to have no significant impacts on 
the RCA indexes. In terms of policy implications, the USA should try to reduce production 
costs of shrimp in the US market instead of imposing antidumping petitions, and the shrimp 
exporting countries should maintain their comparative advantage and diversify into new 
markets.   
 
Keywords: Shrimp, antidumping, revealed comparative advantage, panel data model. 
JEL: C23, F13, P45, Q17. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
International trade stimulates economic growth, which promotes growth and national income. 
Globalization encourages the development of science and technology, creates more jobs, and 
increases living standards. Free trade plays an important role in worldwide economic 
development.  
 
For developing countries, in particular, the agricultural sector contributes significantly to 
economic growth. Exporting agricultural products to world markets is a traditional way of 
improving national income and development, as well as reducing poverty in developing 
countries. Aquaculture is also increasingly important for many countries, and seafood products 
contribute significantly to international trade in both quantity and quality. 
 
Aquaculture has expanded the seafood industry, increasing production from 2.5 million tons in 
1970 to more than 35 million tons in 2000, with most of the increase occurring in developing 
nations (Aksoy et al., 2005). Developing countries account for more than 50 percent of the 
global fish product trade by value, and for around 50 percent of globe aquatic products traded. 
Among many species of aquatic products, shrimp has been the largest single commodity in 
terms of value, accounting for about 15 percent of the total value of internationally traded 
fishery products in 2010 (Deutsch et al., 2011), and for 17% of global seafood in 2006 (Asche 
et al., 2012). Asia and some Latin America countries are the main regions that provide shrimp 
to international markets. 
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The USA has a high demand for shrimp products, so that shrimp suppliers from both foreign 
countries and US firms have become highly competitive. Imported shrimp has frequently been 
the subject of antidumping investigations (that is, imports sold at less than fair value) and 
countervailing duty investigations (that is, subsidized imports) in the USA (see, for example, 
Kassam and Malhotra, 2006; Wang and Reed, 2014). 
 
Even though Free Trade Agreements have eliminated many obstacles in international trade, a 
government might impose antidumping tariffs on imports from selected countries if it 
determines that: (1) the imports are being sold at less than a fair price (or dumped) in domestic 
markets; and (2) the pricing of these imports is harming, or threatening to harm, domestic 
producers of the same goods (Klitgaard and Schiele, 1998). While lower tariffs have been 
applied over the past three decades on account of the proliferation of bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements, the use of antidumping and countervailing duties have been increasing as 
alternative patterns of trade prevention. To state the obvious, US antidumping measures 
imposed on shrimp products would be a major obstacle for the international shrimp trade (Wang 
and Reed, 2015). 
 
The US antidumping duties are more likely to be imposed on sectors in which the USA has low 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA) (Bown et al., 2005). The RCA of the same products 
will vary across different countries because of a number of factors associated with natural 
resources and economic structures. As an example, Shen (2010) argues that US antidumping 
actions against China have focused mainly on products that have strong RCA in the US market. 
Despite the imposition of US antidumping actions, 35 kinds of Chinese products have managed 
to maintain their strong RCA in the US market in most years.  
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In terms of the shrimp trade in the US market, which is a primary focus of the paper, China, 
Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, India, Indonesia and Mexico are the major suppliers. Shrimp 
products from these seven countries have frequently being subject to the imposition of US 
antidumping duties. 
 
Overall, RCA is a useful tool to evaluate the status of comparative advantage among countries. 
The strength of RCA can be affected by trade policy, such as antidumping policies, among 
others. However, whether a certain product or certain industry sector can maintain their 
comparative advantage can differ for different products. In this paper, RCA is used to evaluate 
the degree of comparative advantage in the US market and other leading shrimp suppliers. 
There is a substantive literature regarding the demand for a variety of seafood species, but 
studies on shrimp consumed in the USA are relatively few compared with other seafood (Wang 
and Reed, 2015). 
 
For a better understanding of the possible effects of US antidumping policies on the shrimp 
trade, it is important to explore the bilateral comparative advantage of the seven main shrimp 
exporting countries with the USA, and whether the US antidumping policy affects the bilateral 
comparative advantage of the exporting countries. It is also important for policy implementation 
to determine whether the shrimp exporting countries can maintain or lose their comparative 
advantage when they are subject to US antidumping policies.  
 
In order to investigate the two issues mentioned above, we will calculate the bilateral RCA for 
each shrimp exporting country in the US market, and investigate the determinants of the RCA 
of the shrimp exporting countries. The paper will determine the extent to which the US 
antidumping policies affect the RCA of the seven major shrimp exporters to the USA.  
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as given below. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
US shrimp market. The literature on both antidumping policies and bilateral comparative 
advantage (RCA) are reviewed in Section 3. The Bilateral Revealed Comparative Advantage is 
calculated, the empirical model is presented, and the data sources are discussed, in Section 4. 
This is followed by the empirical results in Section 5. Some concluding remarks are given in 
Section 6. 
 
2. US Shrimp Market 
 
Since the 2000s, shrimp has been a favourite seafood in the USA. High demand for shrimp has 
led the USA to become one of the largest shrimp importers worldwide. Shrimp has several 
positive attributes, such as being low in fat, a good source of protein, containing important 
vitamins and minerals, and being easy to digest. These reasons for the high quality 
characteristics of shrimp products make consumers demand its availability. In 2007, US 
customers consumed 4.1 pounds of shrimp per capita, compared with 2.5 pounds in 1994, which 
is a substantial increase in 13 years (Market Indicator Report, 2010).  
 
Asche et al. (2012) comment that the consumption of shrimp in the USA reflects the global 
surge in shrimp farming activities. In 2004, shrimp was ranked the first in per capita seafood 
consumption at 4.2 pounds, which was almost one pound per capita greater than the second 
ranked seafood category, namely tuna at 3.3 pounds per capita. In 2010, shrimp consumption 
still remained high at 4.0 pounds per capita, in comparison with 2.7 pounds per capita of tuna, 
with the difference between the two increasing to 1.3 pounds per capita. The majority of the 
consumption was supplied from imported farm- raised shrimp, as the USA has become the 
 6 
world’s largest shrimp import market. Currently, the supply of shrimp into the US market is 
from foreign suppliers. In 1980, domestic shrimp in the USA had a 43% market share, but that 
share had declined drastically to 12% by 2001. 
 
The developing countries in Asia and Latin America are the major areas supplying shrimp into 
the world market, in general, and into the US market, in particular. These shrimp exporting 
countries include China, Thailand, Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Ecuador, and Mexico. The rapid 
increase of farmed shrimp production, coupled with US domestic wild-caught fisheries, has 
created trade competitiveness in the USA (Asche et al., 2012). In order to protect the US 
domestic shrimp activities, trade restrictions on shrimp against these major shrimp suppliers 
was enacted in 2004 after the domestic fishing industry filed anti-dumping complaints against 
several shrimp exporting countries (Keithly and Poudel, 2008).  
 
However, according to Reed and Royales (2014), demand for shrimp in the USA has increased 
over the years, and shrimp is currently the largest imported seafood species, accounting for 29 
percent of seafood imports by dollar value. In 2013, consumers and businesses found 
themselves paying higher prices for shrimp, with lower availability of supply in supermarkets 
and restaurants (Reed and Royales, 2014). 
 
The US shrimp market is highly competitive among shrimp suppliers, both from several main 
foreign exporters and US domestic supply. Cheaper overseas imports have displaced domestic 
supplies, which the USDA valued at about $US 600 million in 2014. Harvests in the Gulf of 
Mexico, which account for most of the US-sourced shrimp, slumped to 18,316 tons through 
July 2015, down 35 percent from five years ago, according to the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (Mulvany, 2015). 
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 In the US shrimp market, shrimp imports dominate domestic supply. Both shrimp prices and 
shrimp supply volume fluctuate considerably. Shrimp supply is dependent on the state of 
shrimp-farming production, which is strongly affected by shrimp disease. In particular, early 
mortality syndrome (hereafter, EMS) has occurred in South-East Asian shrimp cultivation. 
Consequently, EMS has dramatically curtailed shrimp exports to the USA, which also results 
in high US import prices (Reed and Royales, 2014).  
 
The nature of shrimp farming makes shrimp highly susceptible to disease. Eighty percent of 
world shrimp production occurs in small-scale, open-air systems, in which water flows in and 
out between ponds. One of the leading factors behind the higher import prices is the EMS 
epidemic that has affected shrimp supplies in South-East Asia. Specifically, a bacterial disease 
known as acute hepatopancreatic necrosis syndrome (hereafter AHPNS) causes EMS. AHPNS 
kills juvenile shrimp by destroying their hepatopancreas, an organ crucial to the animal’s 
digestion. The disease spreads quickly as shrimp eat and infect other shrimp, and can destroy a 
pond’s entire shrimp population within a matter of months.  
 
In addition, the syndrome’s onset occurs before the shrimp are mature enough to reproduce. 
First appearing in China in 2009, AHPNS spread to Vietnam in 2010, Malaysia in 2011, and 
Thailand, the world’s largest shrimp exporter, in 2012. AHPNS has affected shrimp supplies, 
particularly Pacific white shrimp and black tiger shrimp, in the latter three countries (Reed and 
Royales, 2014). The EMS caused the shrimp industry losses that exceeded $1 billion in 2013 
(Worldfishing and Aquaculture, 2014).  
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Moreover, the US domestic shrimp supply has been negatively affected by the continuous rise 
in fuel prices, which has had a direct impact on operational costs (FAO, 2008). Owing to these 
reasons, shrimp supply and shrimp imports prices have been strongly influenced by shrimp 
disease and production cost, particularly fuel prices. 
 
Processed shrimp imports were also higher in the US market, which indicates a positive market 
trend for value-added shrimp (FAO, 2009). It is interesting to note that in terms of volume, the 
third supplier was Ecuador, with 15,700 tons, while in terms of value, the third exporter to the 
US was Vietnam (US$ 95 million). Asian nations accounted for almost 80% of the total supply 
of peeled frozen and for greater than 95% of other frozen preparations and breaded frozen to 
the US market, while frozen shell-on shrimp had a higher share of Latin American supplies.  
 
Furthermore, US shrimp imports are influenced by the exchange rate. For instance, in 2011, 
Asian suppliers to the US suffered from the effects of the weakening US dollar against Asian 
currencies, in particular, the Thai Baht and Indonesian Rupiah (FAO, 2011). This caused a 
decline in shrimp exports from these shrimp exporters. 
 
Regarding the US demand side, demand was strong in both restaurants and in supermarkets, 
driven primarily by improved disposable income and employment opportunities. The middle to 
higher income consumers provide the primary consumer market for shrimp in the USA (FAO, 
2014). 
 
In general, the US shrimp market is one of the largest markets worldwide. The US demand for 
shrimp is relatively high, with the main shrimp suppliers for the US market coming from foreign 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America. Shrimp demand in the US market depends on 
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many factors, including income and seasonal influences. Furthermore, shrimp price imports 
into the US market fluctuate considerably, and is caused by shrimp disease, shrimp production 
of foreign suppliers, import tariffs, and seasonality, among others. 
 
3.  Antidumping and RCA with the US Shrimp Trade 
 
Baughman (2004) argued that antidumping duties imposed on shrimp suppliers would lead to 
an increase in the US prices of both domestic and imported shrimp. Consequently, the price 
increases would be passed on to shrimp-consuming industries, including food processors, 
grocery stores, and restaurants, and eventually to US consumers. Nguyen (2010) examined the 
effects of US laws and policy on catfish prices and trade flows. Both price and demand for 
domestic catfish increased after the US ITC imposed an antidumping tariff on catfish imports 
from Vietnam. The empirical results showed that the tariff was ineffective, and antidumping 
policies were evaluated as a weak tool to protect the US catfish industry. Moreover, US 
consumers have borne the burden from the consequences of higher domestic catfish prices. 
 
According to Debaere (2010), the US antidumping case against shrimp exporters in the US 
market is the largest case since the imposition of steel tariffs. Estimates for the shrimp market 
provide evidence that large countries can affect world prices and/or domestic prices through 
their trade policies. However, competition has also led to trade disputes. Seafood exporting 
countries (mainly developing countries) complained that importing countries (mainly 
developed countries) used antidumping tariffs, stringent market standards or other barriers to 
protect inefficient domestic industries. On the other hand, importing countries accused seafood 
exporters of gaining an unfair competitive advantage through ignoring environmental and social 
costs, and asked for a level playing field (Cai et al., 2010).  
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 Shen (2011) examined the correlation between RCA and US antidumping duties against 97 
Chinese products that has been affected by US antidumping petitions. It was argued that the US 
antidumping action against China focused mainly on Chinese products with high RCA in the 
US market. Of the 97 Chinese products, there were 62 products with high RCA relative to US 
products, accounting for 64% of the total products. This indicated that the US antidumping 
petitions focused on Chinese products that possessed high RCA compared with related US 
products. 
 
Furthermore, of the 62 products mentioned above, 35 products still maintained high RCA, while 
27 lost their advantage in the US market. Shen (2011) argued that, “although US [antidumping] 
actions against Chinese products cannot fundamentally cripple the strong RCA of China’s 
exports (cannot cripple all 62 products that have high RCA above as 35 products still maintain 
high RCA), it has caused negative destruction effects to some exports (make 27 products lost 
their RCA) to the US.” 
 
However, Shen (2011) explored the impact of the RCA on US antidumping duties, not US 
antidumping on the RCA. In addition, Bown and McCulloch (2005) found that US industries 
that filed antidumping petition counselling had a lower RCA index than those which did not 
file antidumping petitions. Therefore, US industries which have lost RCA, or are losing RCA, 
are more likely to file antidumping petitions against China1.  
1 The initialization of an antidumping petition occurs when the Department of Commerce determines that a petition 
has satisfied all necessary requirements to initiate an investigation, in which case the Department of Commerce 
will publish a Notice of Initiation in the Federal Register. The Notice of Initiation will lay out a general history of 
the proceeding, including dates of official filings, as well as the scope of the investigation, explain how the 
Department of Commerce made a determination of industry support, and details how the petitioners calculated 
normal value and US price. This is referred to as question 15 in the site given above. 
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 Overall, the RCA is a useful tool for evaluating the status of comparative advantage for different 
countries, though it can be affected by government policy, such as antidumping petitions. As 
discussed in Section 1, whether a certain product or certain industry sector can maintain their 
comparative advantage can differ for different products. Therefore, in this paper, we use RCA 
to evaluate the degree of comparative advantage in the US market and leading international 
shrimp suppliers. 
 
He et al. (2013) use the gravity model of international trade to investigate the determinants of 
shrimp imports from China, Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia to the USA Their empirical 
results show that US GDP per capita has a positive impact on shrimp volume imports from the 
four suppliers to the USA. In particular, the winter and fall seasons are the times of increasing 
shrimp imports into the USA. Furthermore, antidumping tariff law has been effective in 
curtailing shrimp imports from the four exporters. The empirical results also confirmed that the 
weakening dollar against the currencies of the four shrimp suppliers slowed down shrimp 
exports. 
 
Wang and Reed (2014) investigated the demand elasticity of imported shrimp in the USA by 
shrimp exporting countries. They also tested how countervailing duties imposed by the USA 
affected source-specific shrimp imports. The results indicated that the US demand for imported 
shrimp is inelastic. Moreover, even with the countervailing duties imposed on shrimp exporting 
countries, US total shrimp imports were predicted to increase. 
 
In addition, Wang and Reed (2014) investigated whether the final decision of US antidumping 
duties in 2004 on imported shrimp distorted a named country’s (that is, a country that imposes 
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antidumping laws on shrimp suppliers) exports to third markets. They found that the named 
countries’ (that is, USA) trade flows (from countries such as China, Ecuador, India, Thailand 
and Vietnam) had been reoriented (or diverted) to other markets during the period of US 
antidumping duties imposed against their shrimp exports. This result is in line with previous 
studies on trade deflection (Bown and Crowley, 2007). 
 
Wang and Reed (2015) analyzed the effect of US shrimp antidumping duty on import diversion. 
The empirical results indicated that antidumping duties shifted the shrimp trade from named 
countries, as discussed above) to non-named countries (that is, countries that do not implement 
antidumping laws on shrimp suppliers). They concluded that the effect of trade protection 
through antidumping for US shrimp was a weak trade tool.  
 
A number of researchers have investigated the impacts of US antidumping policy on the shrimp 
trade. Most studies have focused on US shrimp demand, rising US shrimp prices, and shrimp 
trade diversion or deflection. However, few papers have studied the correlations between the 
bilateral RCA of shrimp exporting countries with shrimp importing countries and the associated 
antidumping laws. To the best of our knowledge, the paper is the first empirical analysis based 
on a panel regression model to investigate the impact of US antidumping petitions on shrimp 
exporting countries. 
 
4. Empirical Model 
4.1. Bilateral Revealed Comparative Advantage 
 
In order to capture the bilateral competitiveness of each of the seven exporting countries with 
the USA as the importing country, we compute the revealed comparative advantage indexes 
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(RCA indexes). Following Utkulu and Seymen (2004), the version of RCA from Balassa (1965) 
can be derived as given in equation (1): 
 
RCAi = (Xi - Mi) / (Xi + Mi)                 (1) 
 
where Xi and Mi represent exports and imports, respectively, and i = 1,…,7 represents the shrimp 
exporting country.  
 
The RCA index in equation (1) represents the bilateral competitiveness between each of the 
seven shrimp exporters with respect to the US importers within the US shrimp market only. 
The range of the RCA index is from -1 (that is, Xi = 0 and revealed comparative disadvantage) 
to 1 (that is, Mi = 0 and revealed comparative advantage).  It is crucial that RCA calculations 
are based on observed trade data, for which there are likely influences of government trade 
policies in the associated markets, such as tariffs, quotas or subsidies (see further details in 
Utkulu and Seymen, 2004).  
 
4.2 Panel data model 
 
In order to capture how US antidumping policies affect RCA for each of the seven shrimp 
exporters (China, Vietnam, Ecuador, Thailand, India, Indonesia and Mexico) with the US 
importers in the US shrimp market, we use the panel data model to analysis the determinants 
of RCA. The specific panel data model is given as follows: 
 
              𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖= 𝛼𝛼 +  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽 +  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ,  i = 1,…, 7 ;  t = 1,…, T ,              (2) 
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where 𝛽𝛽 is a k-dimensional vector, i denotes each of the seven shrimp exporting countries, t 
denotes time for T observations in the panel,  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖  denotes the unobservable 
individual-specific effect, and  𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  denotes the random disturbance (for further details, see 
Baltagi, 1995).  
 
Before conducting the panel data regression, it is necessary to conduct the Hausman test for 
model selection. The Hausman test is typically applied to tests for fixed versus random effects 
models under the null hypothesis (𝐻𝐻0) that the random effects estimator is consistent and BLUE 
(that is, the best linear unbiased estimator), against the alternative hypothesis (𝐻𝐻1) that the 
random effects estimator is inconsistent (see, for example, Maddala and Lahiri, 2010).  
 
The Hausman test statistic is given as: 
 
𝑚𝑚1 = 𝑞𝑞�1′ [𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞�1)]−1𝑞𝑞�1, where  𝑞𝑞�1 =  ?̂?𝛽𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 −  ?̂?𝛽𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 
 
where GLS denotes Generalised Least Squares and within is the null hypothesis estimator. 
Under 𝐻𝐻0, 𝑚𝑚1 follows the asymptotic 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘2  distribution, where k denotes the dimension of the 
slope vector β (see Baltagi, 1995 for further details).  
 
The dependent variable is 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, as given in equation (1), which is defined as the revealed 
comparative advantage of the exporting country i to the USA. Data are available for the period 
from January 2003 to December 2014. The data sources and definitions of the explanatory 
variables are summarized in Table 1, while the descriptive statistics of the variables by country 
are given in Table 2.  
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The numbers of US antidumping actions against the seven exporting countries are separated 
into two parts,  namely the preliminary investigation and the final antidumping decision, for 
which the two phases are captured by two dummy variables,  𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
respectively. The data sources and definitions of the explanatory variables are presented in 
Table 3, and the detailed information for the EMS variable is presented in Table 4.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Bilateral Revealed Comparative Advantage for Seven Shrimp Exporting Countries 
 
In order to capture the comparative advantage of product-exporting countries in terms of 
international trade, a number of studies have used the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 
index. RCA indexes can be calculated to measure the magnitude of comparative advantage of 
either a sectoral industry, such as agriculture, aquaculture, or textiles, or a specific commodity. 
Furthermore, RCA indexes can be used to evaluate either the comparative advantage among 
producing countries in the framework of a world market, or bilateral comparative advantage 
country by country. 
 
In the situation of the competitiveness of international trade within the US shrimp market, it is 
useful to explore the bilateral comparative advantage among the seven shrimp exporting 
countries with the USA. 
 
The bilateral RCA of Vietnam, China, Thailand, Ecuador, India and Indonesia are relatively 
close to 1 for a long period in the sample, specifically from 2003 to 2014. China’s RCA indexes 
have minor fluctuations over the period 2011 to 2014. This situation might be explained by the 
rising domestic demand for shrimp products and the severe impact of the EMS shrimp disease, 
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which first occurred in China in 2009. The bilateral RCA indexes for Vietnam, Thailand, 
Ecuador, India and Indonesia have been stable over a long period from 2003 to 2014. Therefore, 
the estimated bilateral RCA implies a strong tendency for these countries to export shrimp to 
the US market.  
 
In other words, these countries are relatively adept at producing shrimp in comparison with the 
USA. For Mexico, its RCA indexes are slightly lower as compared with the other six countries, 
but they have always exceeded 0.4. The bilateral RCA indexes of Mexico have increased over 
the period 2003 to 2014, and were remarkably close to 1 during the period 2011 to 2014. This 
situation might be explained by the increasing shrimp production in Mexico. In addition, the 
US demand for shrimp has been recovering in accordance with the US economic recovery in 
recent years. 
 
Overall, the empirical results of the bilateral RCA indexes indicate that most of the seven 
shrimp supplying countries have significant comparative advantage over US shrimp producers. 
On the other hand, as a highly developed country, the USA tends to exploit its resources, 
focusing mainly on the high technology industry rather than shrimp farming and related 
aquaculture. Moreover, the labour costs in highly developed countries such as the USA is 
typically much higher than in developing countries. Therefore, shrimp farming or shrimp 
capturing activities in the USA are usually at a much greater cost compared with the seven 
shrimp exporting countries. Consequently, the US shrimp producing activities are relatively 
ineffective.  
 
According to Shen (2011), RCA is one of the leading factors that have led to the US 
antidumping petitions. The USA intends to use the antidumping policy as a tool to protect the 
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domestic shrimp industry, which is less competitive in terms of production costs. Bown and 
McCulloch (2005) argue that US industries that are filing antidumping petitions have a lower 
RCA index than those which do are not filing such petitions. Therefore, as discussed previously, 
US industries which have lost RCA, or are losing RCA, are more likely to file antidumping 
petitions against foreign suppliers (Shen, 2011). 
 
In the following section, we investigate if US antidumping policy is a useful and efficient policy 
to affect the bilateral RCA of the seven major shrimp exporting countries.  The estimated results 
of the panel data model will be presented in Section 5.2. 
 
5.2 Effects of Anti-dumping on RCA   
 
In order to investigate how the US antidumping actions and other important factors affect 
bilateral RCA, this paper uses the R software (version 3.2.4) for the empirical application. Three 
approaches for the panel data are used, including pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the 
fixed effects model, and the random effects model. The correlations between the explanatory 
variable and panel data estimates are shown in Table 6. 
 
Regarding model selection, we follow two steps. First, the F test for individual effects is used 
to test whether the pooled OLS or the fixed effects model is preferred statistically. As the F test 
value of 28.251 is significant at the 1% level, the fixed effects model is preferable. Second, the 
Hausman test is used to test whether the pooled random effects or fixed effects model is 
preferred statistically. The null hypothesis is that the coefficients estimated by the efficient 
random effects estimator are the same as those estimated by the consistent fixed effects 
estimator (see Baltagi, 1995).  
 18 
 The Hausman test results indicate that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 10% level, 
which means there is no significant correlation between the individual effects and the 
explanatory variables. Therefore, the random panel data model estimates will be discussed in 
the remainder of the paper. 
 
The estimated results of the random effects model are presented in Table 6. The signs of the 
estimated coefficients are generally as expected. The estimation results show that the two policy 
dummy variables, PRELIM and FINAL, are not statistically significant. This implies that the 
preliminary investigation and the US antidumping final decisions have not significantly 
affected the bilateral RCA of the seven major shrimp exporting countries.  
 
Wang and Reed (2015) investigated whether named exporters systematically altered their 
shrimp trade patterns after their products have had US antidumping duties imposed. Their 
analysis showed that the shrimp trade flows were reoriented (or redirected) to other markets, 
including the European Union and Japan, when US antidumping duties were levied against their 
shrimp products in the US market. In addition, as discussed previously, this empirical finding 
is in line with previous studies on trade deflection and redirection (Bown and Crowley, 2007; 
Grant and Anders, 2011).  
 
The bilateral RCA indexes of seven shrimp exporting countries and the US have not been 
significantly affected by US antidumping, while the shrimp trade flows from these seven 
countries have been reoriented to the EU and Japan markets. This suggests that the capacity of 
the domestic US shrimp supply is relatively small compared with the foreign suppliers.  
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On the other hand, the US shrimp industry is not efficient in terms of cost production. Therefore, 
the bilateral RCA indexes have not been affected by the US antidumping policy. The seven 
exporting countries have maintained their comparative RCA indexes, regardless of the US 
antidumping petitions. In addition, the shrimp supply into the US market depends strongly on 
foreign supplies mainly from developing countries in Asia and Latin America. 
 
The coefficient of the real price of shrimp products from the exporting country to the USA 
(PRICE) variable is -0.014, and is statistically significant at the 1% level. As the shrimp 
imported price increases by 1 $US/kilo leads the bilateral RCA indexes to decrease by 0.015 
unit, this means the bilateral RCA is highly negative and significant to the shrimp exported 
price from the seven exported countries to the US market. This empirical finding is in 
accordance with the results of Kiet et al. (2006), who investigated the RCA of the shrimp 
industry in Vietnam, and concluded that the competitive advantage of shrimp is strongly 
sensitive to the export price in Vietnam. 
 
The coefficient of shrimp disease (EMS) variable is not statistically significantly, although the 
coefficient of EMS has a negative sign and shows a negative correlation between RCA and 
EMS. The empirical results show that the severe shrimp disease has no statistical significance 
on bilateral RCA.  
 
However, EMS is the most severe disease in the shrimp industry, with the first outbreak in 
shrimp farms in China in 2009, which spread rapidly to other shrimp producing and exporting 
countries in Asia. The disease reduced shrimp production substantially, and also increased 
shrimp prices significantly. Even though the lower shrimp production and higher shrimp prices 
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were caused, at least partly, by EMS, the shrimp supply into the USA has been maintained, 
which led to the stable RCA of the shrimp exporting countries. 
 
Domestic US shrimp production (USSHRIMP) shows no significant impact on the bilateral 
RCA indexes, with a coefficient value of -0.014. On the contrary, the US income per capita 
(USINCOME) has a positive effect on the bilateral RCA, as the coefficient value of 0.086 is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Therefore, US income per capita has a positive 
correlation with the bilateral RCA, and suggests that when national income increases by 10 
million dollars, this leads to an increase of 0.0913 in the bilateral RCA indexes. In other words, 
the demand for imports shrimp in the USA will increase with increasing national income. 
 
There is no statistical impact for the exchange rates of the currency of the shrimp exporting 
countries against the US dollar on bilateral RCA (EXCH). However, the coefficient of EXCH 
is only 0.0006, which shows that the exchange rate has virtually no impact on the bilateral RCA. 
 
The seasonal dummy variables, Q1, Q2, Q3, are used to capture the seasonality on the bilateral 
RCA. Seasonality indirectly affects the bilateral RCA through the shrimp volume imports into 
the USA, which is relevant to shrimp production and shrimp demand in the US market. The 
coefficients of the second and third quarters are -0.059 and -0.058, respectively, which suggest 
that the bilateral RCA indexes during the second and third quarters are significantly lower than 
in the remaining two quarters. These estimated seasonal effects are consistent with the FAO 
(2014), whereby shrimp is likely to join turkey during the traditional Thanksgiving in 
November, as well as in the Christmas and New Year celebrations. These are indicators for the 
positive impacts in quarters one and four. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Based on the empirical results, the antidumping duty would seem to be an ineffective tool to 
protect the US shrimp industry. On the other hand, developing countries remain as major 
suppliers in terms of shrimp products to the US market, regardless of the US antidumping 
petitions. 
 
This is one of only a few studies in which antidumping policy imposed on the shrimp 
commodity has been investigated using an econometric model. The empirical estimates 
obtained in the paper suggest that the shrimp demand in the USA is substantially met by shrimp 
suppliers from developing countries as the domestic US shrimp supply is insubstantial 
compared with the US demand for shrimp.  
 
The findings of the paper contribute empirical evidence and support for several studies which 
suggest that the US antidumping policy is a weak trade tool and harmful to US consumers and 
foreign suppliers. 
 
The paper has studied only one aspect of the possible impacts of US antidumping on the RCA 
index. US antidumping actions might have other impacts which should be studied in detail in 
future research, including: (1) US antidumping petitions might affect household incomes from 
exporting shrimp countries, which are primarily developing countries; and (2) the policy might 
also burden US consumers for shrimp owing to the higher prices of shrimp imports. 
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 Figure 1  
Bilateral Comparative Advantage Indexes of Seven Shrimp Exporting Countries 
Compared with the US Shrimp Sector 
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Table 1  
Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Sources 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Real price of shrimp products from exporting 
country  i  to USA recorded at US customs 
(real price = nominal price/import and export 
commodity index in USA); unit: US dollar 
per kilo. 
National Marine Fisheries 
Services 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 if the exporting country is in 
the period of preliminary investigation, 
otherwise = 0. 
International Trade 
Administration, USA 
𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 if the exporting country is in the 
period of implementation of anti-dumping 
duty, otherwise = 0. 
Department of Commerce 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
For the period of the most destroying disease 
on shrimp named EMS (Early Mortality 
Syndrome) 
NACA, FAO (2011); 
Lightner et al. (2012), 
Mooney (2012), Flegel 
(2012), Leaño and Mohan 
(2012) 
𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Quantity of domestic shrimp in USA; 
unit: millions kilos. 
National Marine Fisheries 
Services 
𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Income per capita in USA; unit: 10,000 
US$ per month 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis of the USA 
𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Exchange rate toward each exporting 
countries. OANDA Services 
𝑄𝑄1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑄𝑄1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 in the first quarter,  otherwise 𝑄𝑄1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0  
𝑄𝑄2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑄𝑄2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 in the second quarter,  otherwise 𝑄𝑄2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0  
𝑄𝑄3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑄𝑄3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 in the third quarter,  otherwise 𝑄𝑄3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0  
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics for 6 Shrimp Exporting Countries 
Vietnam Unit Min Mean Max S.D. 
RCA ratio 0.761 0.980 1.000 0.036 
PRICE $US/kilo 6.416 9.119 12.853 1.385 
EXCH 1,000 VND/$US 14.820 17.739 21.150 2.382 
China Unit Min Mean Max S.D. 
RCA ratio 0.580 0.940 1.000 0.086 
PRICE $US/kilo 3.436 4.682 6.703 0.731 
EXCH CNY/$US 6.098 7.158 8.268 0.816 
Thailand Unit Min Mean Max S.D. 
RCA ratio 0.874 0.989 1.000 0.019 
PRICE $US/kilo 4.500 6.486 9.793 1.246 
EXCH  THB/$US 28.967 34.533 42.863 4.150 
Ecuador Unit Min Mean Max S.D. 
RCA ratio 0.830 0.989 1.000 0.0191 
PRICE $US/kilo 3.886 5.297 8.053 0.928 
EXCH 1,000 ECS/$US 24.053 24.127 24.263 0.052 
India Unit Min Mean Max S.D. 
RCA ratio 0.844 0.987 1.000 0.023 
PRICE $US/kilo 5.737 7.864 9.982 1.041 
EXCH INR/$US 39.356 48.297 63.778 6.186 
Indonesia Unit Min Mean Max S.D. 
RCA ratio 0.877 0.986 1.000 0.012 
PRICE $US/kilo 5.005 6.881 10.364 1.139 
EXCH 1,00 IDR/$US 82.059 95.713 124.12 10.001 
Mexico Unit Min Mean Max S.D. 
RCA ratio -0.590 0.778 0.996 0.341 
PRICE $US/kilo 4.959 8.855 16.049 2.378 
EXCH MXN /$US 10.099 11.967 14.682 1.144 
USSHRIMP million kilos 0.104 0.893 2.029 0.518 
USINCOME $US 0.927 1.221 1.501 0.157 
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Table 3   
EMS – Shrimp Disease (Early Mortality Syndrome) 
Country EMS – dummy variable 
Vietnam EMS = 1 after January 2010, otherwise EMS  =0 
China EMS = 1 after January 2009, otherwise EMS = 0 
Thailand EMS = 1 after January 2012, otherwise EMS = 0 
Ecuador EMS = 0 any time  
India EMS = 0 any time 
Indonesia EMS = 0 any time 
Mexico EMS = 1 after January 2013, otherwise EMS  =0 
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Table 4  
US Preliminary Investigation and Final Decisions for Seven Exporting Countries 
COUNTRY Preliminary Investigation 
Vietnam PRELIM = 1 in 1~9/2003 and 1~12/2011, otherwise 0 
China PRELIM = 1 in 1~9/2003 and 1~12/2011, otherwise 0 
Thailand PRELIM = 1 in 1~9/2003 and 1~12/2011, otherwise 0 
Ecuador PRELIM = 1 in 1~12/2003 and 1~12/2011, otherwise 0 
India PRELIM = 1 in 1~9/2003 and 4/2011~3/2011, otherwise 0 
Indonesia PRELIM = 1 within 1 ~ 12/2011, otherwise 0 
Mexico PRELIM = 0 
COUNTRY Final Decisions 
Vietnam FINAL = 1 in 12/2004~12/2009 and 8/2013~12/2014, otherwise 0 
China FINAL = 1 in 12/2004~12/2009 and 8/2013~12/2014, otherwise 0 
Thailand FINAL = 1 in 12/2004~12/2009, otherwise 0 
Ecuador FINAL = 1 in 12/2004~8/2007 and 8/2013~12/2014, otherwise 0 
India FINAL = 1 in 12/2004~12/2009 and 8/2013~12/2014, otherwise 0 
Indonesia FINAL  = 0 
Mexico FINAL  = 0 
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 Table 5  
Correlations for Explanatory Variables 
 
Variables PRICE USSHRIMP USINCOME EXCH 
PRICE 1 -0.243 -0.350 -0.225 
USSHRIMP -0.243 1 0.013 -0.029 
USINCOME -0.350 0.013 1 0.680 
EXCH -0.225 -0.0289 0.680 1 
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Table 6  
Effects of Antidumping on RCA 
Variable Pooled Estimation Fixed Effect Random Effect 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
0.031** 
(0.012) 
-0.013 
(0.014) 
0.010 
(0.014) 
𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
0.057*** 
(0.010) 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
0.024 
(0.015) 
-0.002 
(0.016) 
0.0003 
(0.016) 
𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
0.035 
(0.034) 
0.094*** 
(0.035) 
0.086** 
(0.034) 
𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
0.001*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.001) 
0.0006 
(0.0007) 
𝑄𝑄1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 -0.019 (0.015) -0.017 (0.014) -0.017 (0.014) 
𝑄𝑄2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 -0.065*** (0.015) -0.058*** (0.012) -0.059*** (0.012) 
𝑄𝑄3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 -0.031** (0.014) -0.030** (0.013) -0.058*** (0.012) 
Constant 0.977*** (0.047) 
0.969*** 
(0.053) 
0.965*** 
(0.058) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.141 0.262 0.057 
Log-Likeihood 
F-statistic 
Prob (F-statistic) 
549.383 
17.583 
0.000 
628.963 
23.386 
0.000 
- 
7.130 
0.000 
Model selection test 
F test 
(P-value) 
28.251*** 
(0.000) - 
Hausman Test 
𝜒𝜒2 
Prob. > 𝜒𝜒2 
- 0.6434 (0.9928) 
Observation 1008 1008 1008 
 Note:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
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